Introduction
According to CPRC, the most enduring form of poverty is intergenerationally transmitted poverty (IGT poverty) (Hulme, Moore, Shepherd 2001) Economic analysis of intergenerational transfers has typically been focused on the transfer of wealth, not its mirror image What are the factors that prevent the accumulation and intergenerational transfer of wealth?
Conceptual framework: Building blocks for understanding intergenerational transfers
The conceptual framework for understanding parental decision-making has the following components:
Preferences: Parents, as decision makers, care about the wellbeing of their children, though this may vary across children. ii) Returns: Parents take into account the extent to which these investments will make both their children and themselves betteroff in the future when choosing to invest in their children.
iii) Constraints: Parents' ability to undertake investments in their children are constrained by the resources -money and timeavailable to them, the prices they face and the relationship between factors that affect child development and outcomes such as good health, schooling, self-esteem, etc. iv) Bargaining: Parents may disagree about these decisions; hence the ability of an individual parent to determine household decisions will also affect these investments.
Building blocks, cont'd
Collectively, these components point to a multitude of factors that affect the intergenerational transfer of wealth:
Parental preferences regarding equality of outcomes across offspring; Expected returns in labor markets, in marriage and in terms of support to parents in their old age; Knowledge and skill regarding appropriate child rearing practices; Household resources; Relative bargaining power of individual household members; Wages and prices; and Community characteristics and resources.
While concepts are described here in terms of parental decisions, they also apply to cases where children live with other relatives or foster carers.
Conceptual framework: Stumbling blocks that prevent the poor from transferring wealth across generations i) Preferences: Parents may care about the welfare of their children, but unequal preferences may lead to their favoring some children over others-for example, sons vs. daughters, older vs. younger children, or biological vs. foster children ii) Returns: Parents may perceive that "returns" to investing in children are low, owing to high child mortality, few opportunities in the labor market, or that returns to investing in some children may be lower than in others (for example, if daughters leave the household upon marriage);
iii) Constraints: Parents may have limited resources, may find the costs of investing in children too high, and may be constrained by their ability to trade off present for future resources, which may be critical when they face adverse shocks; and iv) Bargaining: Parents may exercise their bargaining power in ways that may not be conducive to the transfer of wealth to their children, or to some of their children.
Empirical evidence on intergenerational transfers, lifetime incomes, and inequality
Credit constraints and investments in children Gender differences in transfers and implications for lifetime incomes Assortative matching in the marriage market
Credit constraints and investments in children: overview
If parents did not face credit constraints, they could borrow money, and could invest in children's human capital to equate marginal rate of return to human capital investment to the interest rate. Differences in investments across children would be due to differences in innate ability, or differences in returns that children faced ( 
Gender differences in transfers and impacts on lifetime incomes
To examine the impact of gender differences in schooling and assets transferred to children, need to examine the impact of these differences on lifetime incomes Quisumbing, Estudillo, Otsuka (2004) examine the impact of gender differences in transfers on lifetime incomes of men and women in the Philippines, Sumatra, and Ghana, three countries with very different inheritance and kinship regimes Philippines: bilateral, daughters get education, sons get land Sumatra: matrlineal, daughters used to get more land, sons used to get more schooling, but becoming equalized Ghana: uterine matrilineal, sons get more land and schooling 
Summary of results from 3-country study
In the Philippines and Sumatra, existing distribution of land and schooling between sons and daughters is egalitarian; changing the distribution would even worsen outcomes for daughters in the Philippines In Ghana, however, increasing land would increase women's income; increasing education would not, possibly because of low returns to women's education in rural labor markets While it is difficult to generalize beyond our study sample, we must recognize that transfers are probably biased against women in patrilineal inheritance systems, which tend to be more prevalent Nevertheless, attempts to change the distribution of transfers should tread carefully-examine impacts on lifetime incomes, because we may not know labor market implications; families may also act to counter possible attempts at redistribution
Assortative matching and the marriage market
In many societies, marriage marks the beginning of a new family and economic unit. Future success may depend on "marriage market" outcomes-arrangement reached by bride and groom regarding devolution of assets to the new household If asset accumulation takes time and is difficult for the poor, assets at marriage determine lifetime prosperity Assortative matching increases inequality and reduces social mobility due to intergenerational transfers of assets at marriage Examine evidence from rural Ethiopia (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2005) 
Implications of assortative matching in rural Ethiopia
With assortative matching, social stratification is passed on from one generation to the next The marriage market is a major conduit for household and gender inequality in Ethiopia A promising note: the lower Gini coefficient on current assets indicates other avenues for wealth accumulation during the couple's lifetime, as well as the effect of redistribution policies
Six-country study examining changes in the distrbution of resources at marriage (Quisumbing and Hallman 2005)
Examine changes in human capital and assets brought to marriage in Bangladesh, Philippines, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mexico, Guatemala Motivation: Resources at marriage affect distribution of power within marriage Changes in resources at marriage over time may reveal changes in the distribution of power within households
Findings
Husband-wife age differences decreasing in 4 out of 6 countries. Exceptions are South Africa and Philippines, where women's age at marriage is already high. Husband-wife schooling differences decreasing in 3 out of 6 countries, with the exceptions of Guatemala, Philippines, and Ethiopia. Ethiopia result is probably due to leveling off of girls' enrolment rates. Distribution of assets at marriage continues to favor husbands: difference has remained constant in 3 out of 6 countries, and has even increased in Mexico and Latin America. Gap has decreased for Ethiopia, probably to decollectivization and land to the tiller laws.
